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THE SAME SONG AND DANCE: F.B.T. PRODUCTIONS, LLC v.
AFTERMATH RECORDS AND THE ROLE OF LICENSES IN
THE DIGITAL AGE OF COPYRIGHT LAW
JOHN P. UETZ*
I. “HI, MY NAME IS . . .”1: INTRODUCTION
In 1995, Marshall B. Mathers III signed an Exclusive Artist Recording
Agreement with F.B.T. Productions, LLC (F.B.T.).2  Mathers, who per-
forms and records under the pseudonym “Eminem,” would go on to sell
almost 40 million albums over the next decade and a half.3  With his 2010
release, Recovery, Eminem became the first artist to sell over 1 million digi-
tal copies of an album.4  Pursuant to an agreement that transferred the
exclusive recording services of Eminem to Aftermath Records (After-
math), F.B.T. was receiving royalties of between twelve and twenty percent
of the sales of digital copies of Eminem’s music.5  However, in F.B.T. Pro-
ductions, LLC v. Aftermath Records,6 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that F.B.T. was entitled to fifty percent royalties from the sales
of digital downloads as a matter of law.7
* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Villanova University School of Law.  I would like
to thank Professor Todd Aagaard, Professor Michael Risch, and the members of
the Villanova Law Review for their feedback on this Note.
1. EMINEM, My Name Is, on THE SLIM SHADY LP (Aftermath Entertainment/
Interscope Records 1999).
2. See Edwin F. McPherson, F.B.T. v. Aftermath: Eminem Raps the Record Indus-
try, 29 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 10, 10 (2011) (describing history of Eminem’s
contracts).
3. See id. at 10 (stating that Marshall Mathers is professionally known as
Eminem); see also Gil Kaufman, Eminem and Jay-Z: By the Numbers, MTV NEWS (Sept.
2, 2010), http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1647055/eminem-jayz-by-numbers.
jhtml (comparing sales figures of Eminem and Jay-Z).  Eminem has sold 38.3 mil-
lion albums in the United States and 30.5 million songs as digital downloads. See
Kaufman, supra (reporting Eminem’s sales figures).
4. See Steve Jones, Digital Album Sales Soar, Thanks to Adele, Eminem, USA TO-
DAY, July 14, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/life/music/news/2011-07-13-
eminem-adele-digital-sales_n.htm (reporting that “[o]verall, almost a third (32%)
of the 155.5 million albums sold in the first half of 2011 were digital . . . up 19%
from the same period in 2010”).
5. See McPherson, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing F.B.T.’s agreement with Af-
termath).  Aftermath is a subsidiary of Universal Music Group (UMG). See id. (ex-
plaining contractual arrangements of parties).
6. 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1677 (2011).
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Aftermath had been paying F.B.T. the royalty rate prescribed by the
“Records Sold” provision of their agreement.8  However, the court ruled
that revenue from digital downloads unambiguously fell under the “Mas-
ters Licensed” provision.9  Although both parties had been treating the
relevant transactions as sales, the court found that the contracts between
Aftermath and digital distributors unambiguously showed that Aftermath
was not selling Eminem’s recordings to digital distributors; it was licensing
them.10  Aftermath was giving digital distributors permission to copy and
sell digital copies without actually selling copies of the works to the digital
distributors.11
F.B.T. Productions and other recent cases show that the distinction be-
tween a license and a sale is becoming increasingly unclear in the digital
age.12  This lack of clarity is particularly troublesome because the determi-
nation of whether a transaction is a license or a sale can have important
consequences for consumers.13  The practice of licensing digital versions
of copyrighted works continues to grow, causing concern that copyright
owners are maintaining too much control over their works and thereby
upsetting the balance of rights that copyright law strives to achieve.14  As a
8. See id. at 11 (stating that after audit in 2006, F.B.T. discovered that it had
been receiving royalties according to “Records Sold” provision for digital
downloads).
9. For a discussion of the court’s analysis in F.B.T. Productions, see infra notes
147-64 and accompanying text.
10. See McPherson, supra note 2, at 11 (stating that F.B.T. had been receiving
royalties according to Records Sold provision without challenge until audit was
conducted in 2006); id. at 12-13 (discussing holding in F.B.T. Productions).  The
parties agreed that prior to the current claim, “the only transactions that had trig-
gered the Masters Licensed provision were with third parties that were using
Eminem master recordings in those third parties’ products; in other words,
Eminem masters that were used in a third party’s soundtrack or on a compilation
album that included other artists’ master recordings.” Id. at 11.  Another part of
the contract provided that the sales of permanent downloads were to be included
in total album sales numbers for purposes of escalation of royalties. See id. at 12
(detailing contractual provisions).  The Ninth Circuit found that the transactions
were licenses because UMG did not sell the digital copies to the digital distribu-
tors; it only gave permission to copy the master recording and to sell the copies.
See id. (discussing Ninth Circuit’s holding and reasoning).
11. See id. at 13 (describing how agreements with digital distributors are like
licenses).
12. See 1 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 1:110 (4th
ed. 2009) (explaining different approaches courts have taken in determining
whether consumer is owner or licensee); see also 2 NIMMER, supra, § 7:63, at 7-120
(stating that “whether a licensee owns the licensed copy has generated litigation
and academic literature”).
13. See id. § 1:110, at 1-274 to -276 (discussing benefit of first sale doctrine to
consumers and noting licenses do not confer this benefit).  For a discussion of the
benefits of the first sale doctrine, see infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
14. See Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License?  Contracting Around
Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93, 95 (2006) (stat-
ing that licensing upsets balance between consumer and copyright owner rights
because it circumvents public legislation); Joshua W. Newman, Note, Selling the
Right to License: Examination of the First Sale Doctrine Through the Lens of UMG Record-
2
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result, many legal scholars have proposed ways to restore the balance.15
This Note argues that, despite the differences between the rights associ-
ated with licenses and sales, license agreements are a legitimate way for
copyright owners to protect their rights.16  It further argues that license
agreements preserve the balance of the interests of copyright owners and
the public in the digital context.17
Part II of this Note discusses the purpose of copyright law and how
some of the basic tenets of copyright law help to achieve a balance of the
interests of copyright owners and the public.18  Part III details how the
digital revolution has threatened to upset the balance between the com-
peting interests of copyright owners and the public, focusing on the ease
of infringement and the marginalization of the first sale doctrine.19  Part
IV introduces the license-versus-sale debate by discussing the difference
between a license and a sale and examining the effects of classifying a
transaction as a license.20  Part V addresses the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
F.B.T. Productions and discusses the impact of the case.21  In conclusion,
Part VI argues that licensing is an appropriate way for copyright owners to
ings & Quanta Computer, 35 J. CORP. L. 849, 864-65 (2010) (arguing that use of
license agreements will upset balance of rights by allowing copyright holders to
exploit consumer rights and limit consumer privileges).
15. See Steven Masur, Collective Rights Licensing for Internet Downloads and
Streams: Would It Properly Compensate Rights Holders?, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 39,
40 (2011) (stating that one solution to rampant infringement that has received
attention is collective-rights licensing, which would pay artists royalties from fees
paid by users at Internet service provider level); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Sch-
ultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 891-92 (2011) (arguing that courts
should apply doctrine of copyright exhaustion to restore balance); Newman, supra
note 14, at 866 (arguing that Congress must pass legislation to ensure that first sale
doctrine is applied in digital age); cf. Kurt E. Kruckeberg, Note, Copyright “Band-
Aids” and the Future of Reform, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1545, 1574 (2011) (suggesting
that Congress must strengthen rights of artists in next Copyright Act to restore
bargaining power for artists).
16. For a discussion of why license agreements are a legitimate way for copy-
right owners to protect their rights, see infra notes 176-89 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of how license agreements preserve the balance of inter-
ests between copyright owners and the public, see infra 176-210 and accompanying
text.
18. For a discussion of how basic tenets of copyright law help to achieve a
balance of the interests of copyright owners and the public, see infra notes 24-60
and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of how the digital age has threatened to upset the bal-
ance between the competing interests of copyright owners and the public, see infra
notes 62-94 and accompanying text.
20. For an introduction to the license-versus-sale debate, including a discus-
sion of the differences between licenses and sales and the effect of classifying a
transaction as a license, see infra notes 96-123 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in F.B.T. Productions, see
infra notes 125-74 and accompanying text.
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protect their rights and that licensing preserves the traditional balance of
copyright law.22
II. “GUILTY CONSCIENCE”23: HOW COPYRIGHT LAW BALANCES THE
INTERESTS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS AND THE
INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC
The purpose of copyright law is explicitly stated in Article I of the
Constitution, which gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies.”24  The First Congress exercised this power when it enacted the Copy-
right Act of 1790, which gave authors who registered their work the
exclusive right to reproduce and distribute copies of the work for a limited
time.25  The immediate purpose of granting these rights to authors was to
provide incentive for authors to create.26  However, the incentive was
given with the larger goal of making works of art available for the benefit
of the public.27  In order to accomplish its purpose, copyright law must
22. For an argument that licensing is the appropriate way for copyright own-
ers to protect their rights while preserving the traditional balance of copyright law,
see infra notes 176-210 and accompanying text.
23. EMINEM, Guilty Conscience, on THE SLIM SHADY LP (Aftermath
Entertainment/Interscope Records 1999).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
25. See 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:19 (2011) (discussing
enactment and content of Copyright Act of 1790).  The Copyright Act of 1790
granted the author of “any ‘map, chart, or book’” who registered the work with the
district court “the exclusive right to ‘print, reprint, publish, or vend’” their work
for fourteen years with a renewal option for another fourteen years. Id. (footnote
omitted) (quoting Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124); see also Wheaton v.
Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 661 (1834) (stating that Congress created rights in
Copyright Act that did not exist at common law).  The Court wrote: “Congress,
then, by this act, instead of sanctioning an existing right, as contended for, created
it.  This seems to be the clear import of the law, connected with the circumstances
under which it was enacted.” Id.
26. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 229 (1990) (“The limited monopoly
granted to the artist is intended to provide the necessary bargaining capital to
garner a fair price for the value of the works passing into public use.”); Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (“The rights con-
ferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a
fair return for their labors.”); see also Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright
Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1247-48
(2001) (discussing balance copyright law seeks to achieve between consumer rights
and copyright owner rights).
27. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984) (stating that exclusive rights granted in Copyright Act are “intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the
limited period of exclusive control has expired”); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S.
123, 127 (1932) (stating that “[t]he sole interest of the United States and the pri-
mary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors”).  In Sony, the Court also wrote: “As the text of
4
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adequately protect the competing interests of copyright owners and the
public.28
A. The Interests of Copyright Owners
The Copyright Act gives artists the incentive to create and protects
their interests by granting copyright owners broad exclusive rights and
providing remedies for violations of those rights.29  In 1790, the act speci-
fied only maps, charts, and books as copyrightable works of authorship,
but the current Copyright Act includes many different forms of art as
works of authorship.30  The current version also gives a more complete set
of exclusive rights to copyright owners.31  In addition, the act continues to
the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of
defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or
to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their work product.”
Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.  The purpose of copyright law was recognized as early as
1832, when the Supreme Court stated that the exclusive rights granted to owners
of intellectual property are “the reward stipulated for the advantages derived by
the public for the exertions of the individual, and is intended as a stimulus to those
exertions.”  Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 242 (1832).  In 1858, the Su-
preme Court explicitly recognized the advancement of the public interest as well:
“It is undeniably true, that the limited and temporary monopoly granted to inven-
tors was never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage; the benefit to the
public or community at large was another and doubtless the primary object in
granting and securing that monopoly.”  Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322,
327-28 (1858).
28. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (stating that Congress’s task in copyright law “in-
volves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the
control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and
society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce
on the other hand”); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975) (“The limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a
balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be en-
couraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.” (foot-
note omitted)).
29. For a discussion of the interest in providing copyright owners an incentive
to create, see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
30. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (stating that “[w]orks of authorship include the
following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompa-
nying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works”); PATRY, supra note 25, § 1:19 (stating that Copyright Act
of 1790 only allowed for copyright for books, maps, and charts).
31. Section 106 includes the exclusive right to: (1) reproduce the copyrighted
work; (2) prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work; (3) distribute
copies of the copyrighted work by sale, rental, lease, or lending; (4) perform the
copyrighted work publicly; (5) display the work publicly; and (6) perform the
copyrighted work by means of digital audio transmission. See 17 U.S.C. § 106
(enumerating rights of copyright owners).
5
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specify remedies for violations of these rights—reflecting a necessary com-
bination for the scheme to ensure a sufficient incentive to create.32
Subject to some exceptions, a person or entity commits copyright in-
fringement by violating any of the exclusive rights listed in section 106 of
the Copyright Act.33  Infringement can arise in three ways: direct infringe-
ment, contributory infringement, and vicarious infringement.34  A person
or entity that actually takes any of the actions listed in section 106 without
authorization from the copyright owner commits direct infringement.35  A
person or entity that substantially contributes to the commission of in-
fringing activity, but does not directly engage in the infringing activity, can
be held liable for contributory infringement.36  In order to incur liability
for contributory infringement, the person or entity must know about the
infringing activity and either cause, materially contribute to, or substan-
tially assist in the infringing activity.37  A person or entity that has the abil-
ity to control infringing activity but fails to do so and receives a financial
32. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (defining copyright infringement); 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-
05 (enumerating possible remedies for infringement, including injunctions, im-
pounding and disposition of infringing articles, damages, infringer’s profits, costs,
and attorney’s fees).
33. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (defining copyright infringement).  It is important to
note that the Copyright Act provides many exceptions and limitations on the rights
of copyright owners and that a person or entity that uses the copyrighted work in a
way that falls under one of those exceptions does not commit infringement. See,
e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (specifying uses of work that would otherwise be infringement
but are protected because they are considered “fair use”); 17 U.S.C § 109 (stating
that lawful owner of copy may sell, otherwise transfer, or dispose of copy without
authorization of copyright owner).
34. For a discussion of copyright infringement in its three forms, see infra
notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
35. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (defining copyright infringement); cf. Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-35 (1984) (distinguishing
indirect and direct infringement, recognizing that indirect infringement is not ex-
plicitly mentioned in Copyright Act); Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect
Liability for Copyright Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395,
395-96 (2003) (comparing direct infringement to indirect infringement in flea
market example and stating that “individual sellers of pirated music were obviously
guilty of copyright infringement”).
36. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 437 (recognizing indirect liability for copyright in-
fringement).  In its opinion, the Court stated that contributory copyright infringe-
ment was applied as early as 1911 in Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros. See id. at 435
(referring to Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911)).  The Court noted
Justice Holmes’s statement in Kalem “that the producer had ‘contributed’ to the
infringement,” and that “the label ‘contributory infringement’ has been applied in
a number of lower court copyright cases involving an ongoing relationship be-
tween the direct infringer and the contributory infringer at the time the infringing
conduct occurred.” Id. at 437.
37. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir.
2001) (explaining elements of contributory infringement); Gershwin Publ’g Corp.
v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (same); Licht-
man & Landes, supra note 35, at 396 (same).
6
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benefit from the infringing activity can be held liable for vicarious
infringement.38
The infringement and remedy provisions of the Copyright Act give
copyright owners a way to enforce their exclusive rights.39  If they were
unenforceable, the exclusive rights granted to copyright owners would be
meaningless and they would not serve their purpose of giving authors in-
centive to create.40  Accordingly, the Copyright Act’s provisions granting
exclusive rights and remedies for infringement of those rights work to-
gether to give authors the incentive to create.41
B. The Interests of the Public
Although the Copyright Act grants expansive rights to copyright own-
ers, it also enumerates limitations and exceptions to those rights in order
to achieve the overarching purpose of copyright law: public access to the
creative works of authors.42  Two of the most important doctrines that
limit copyright owners’ exclusive rights are the fair use doctrine and the
first sale doctrine.43  Although these doctrines are limitations on the copy-
right owner’s rights, they can also be viewed as grants of rights to
consumers.44
38. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022 (defining vicarious infringement); Dream-
land Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929)
(holding that dance hall was vicariously liable for orchestra’s direct infringement);
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (stating elements of vicarious infringement); Lichtman &
Landes, supra note 35, at 398 (same).
39. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 477 (referring to remedies for infringement as en-
forcement of copyright owner rights).
40. See Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 183, 195 (“[T]o the extent that the ability to enforce a right is debased, it is
that much less a right.”); see also Liu, supra note 26, at 1279-80 (explaining that
inability to enforce exclusive rights leads to loss of incentive that they are supposed
to create).
41. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-51 (explaining that exclusive rights were in-
tended to provide incentive to create and any use that does not do so need not be
prohibited).
42. For a discussion of the public interest in giving public access to creative
works, see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
43. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (“From
the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted
materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose . . . .”); Liu,
supra note 26, at 1289-96 (describing limitations on exclusive rights of copyright
owners); Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 15, at 929 (same).
44. See Liu, supra note 26, at 1289-94 (characterizing first sale and fair use
doctrines as copy owner’s rights, as opposed to limitations on copyright owner’s
rights); see also Darren Hudson Hick, Mystery and Misdirection: Some Problems of Fair
Use and Users’ Rights, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 485, 490 (2009) (“Among some
thinkers, a notion has developed that the fair use doctrine creates a class of users’
rights.”).  Although Hick disagrees with the notion of users’ rights, he discusses the
concept in some depth, referencing a book entitled The Nature of Copyright: A Law
of Users’ Rights, which argues that “ ‘[U]sers have rights that are just as important as
those of authors and publishers—and these rights are grounded in the law of copy-
7
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The fair use doctrine provides that certain uses of copyrighted works
are fair uses and do not constitute infringement.45  The Copyright Act
gives a list of uses that would be considered fair uses, including “criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research”; how-
ever, the list is not comprehensive.46  Each use must be evaluated individu-
ally according to the four factors listed in the statute to determine whether
or not it is a fair use.47  The fair use doctrine is an affirmative defense;
therefore, the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish that a given
use was a fair use.48
The first sale doctrine is another limitation on the exclusive rights of
copyright owners.49  The doctrine allows the lawful owner of a copy of a
copyrighted work to transfer or dispose of the copy without authorization
from the copyright owner.50  The Supreme Court first articulated the doc-
trine in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.51  In Bobbs-Merrill, the Court held that
the defendant’s resale of books did not violate the plaintiff’s rights as the
copyright owner.52  It explained that the copyright owner exercised its
right.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LIND-
BERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 11 (1991)).
45. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (defining fair use doctrine).  The fair use doc-
trine was a judicial creation until it was codified in the Copyright Act of 1976. See 2
HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 15:1 (2010) (discussing history of
fair use doctrine).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 107; see ABRAMS, supra note 45, § 15:4 (discussing congres-
sional intent and explaining Congress intended that fair use determinations be
made on case-by-case basis balancing factors set forth in statute).
47. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (listing factors for determining whether use is fair
use).  The factors to consider are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
Id.
48. See ABRAMS, supra note 45, § 15:28 (stating that fair use is affirmative de-
fense and discussing resultant consequences).
49. See Victor F. Calaba, Quibbles ‘n Bits: Making a Digital First Sale Doctrine Feasi-
ble, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002) (discussing first sale doctrine
and how it limits copyright owners’ exclusive rights); Newman, supra note 14, at
849 (stating that first sale doctrine is “important tool[ ] that help[s] maximize pub-
lic access to intellectual property and preserve[s] consumer rights”).
50. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (defining first sale doctrine).
51. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).  The first sale doctrine was first codified in the Copy-
right Act of 1909, the year following Bobbs-Merrill. See PATRY, supra note 25, § 1:45
(discussing Copyright Act of 1909).
52. See Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 351 (affirming court of appeals’ dismissal of
claim).  The defendants bought copies of a book to sell at retail. See id. at 341
(discussing facts of case).  The plaintiff, the copyright owner, printed the following
below the copyright notice in the book: “The price of this book at retail is $1 net.
No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale at a less price will be treated
as an infringement of the copyright.” Id.  The plaintiff filed suit for copyright in-
8
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right to distribute the books when it sold them to the defendant, after
which, the copyright owner no longer controlled the fate of the books.53
As currently codified in the U.S. Code, the first sale doctrine states, in
part: “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under
this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the posses-
sion of that copy or phonorecord.”54
Many scholars believe that the first sale doctrine is an important limi-
tation on the exclusive rights of copyright owners.55  Proponents argue
that it provides at least three main benefits to the public.56  First, it makes
copyrighted works more affordable by allowing secondary markets to exist
outside of the control of copyright owners.57  Second, it increases the
fringement because the defendant was selling the book for eighty-nine cents. See
id. at 342 (indicating that defendant was aware that books were copyrighted and
was “familiar with the terms of the notice printed in each copy”).  Prior to the
Supreme Court decision, the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint and
the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. See id. at 341 (discussing
procedure of case).
53. See id. at 350-51 (explaining reasoning for holding).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
55. See Bruce P. Keller & Jeffrey P. Cunard, Copyright in the Digital Age, in SEV-
ENTH ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE, at 293, 309-11 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No. 754, 2003) (discussing
conflicting views of proponents and opponents of first sale doctrine); see also Liu,
supra note 26, at 1266-67 (discussing shift in balance of rights in favor of copyright
owners when first sale doctrine does not apply); Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note
15, at 892-907 (discussing benefits of first sale doctrine and problems with its
marginalization); Winston, supra note 14, at 106 (arguing that circumvention of
first sale doctrine shifts balance of power to copyright owners, which is contrary to
public policy).
56. See R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44
B.C. L. REV. 577, 584 (2003) (listing three primary benefits of first sale doctrine as
affordability, availability, and increased privacy); see also Perzanowski & Schultz,
supra note 15, at 894-901 (discussing benefits of first sale doctrine in addition to
affordability, access, and privacy, including transactional clarity, innovation, and
platform competition).
57. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 15, at 894 (discussing how first sale
doctrine improves affordability for consumers); Reese, supra note 56, at 585-88
(describing ways that first sale doctrine allows greater affordability of copyrighted
works); see also Henry Sprott Long III, Note, Reconsidering the “Balance” of the “Digital
First Sale” Debate: Re-examining the Case for a Statutory Digital First Sale Doctrine to Facili-
tate Second-Hand Digital Media Markets, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1183, 1192 (2008) (discuss-
ing benefits of secondary markets, including “used” sales, rental, and public
lending).  The first sale doctrine allows retailers to determine the price of a copy
of the work, fostering competition and leading to lower prices for consumers. See
Reese, supra note 56, at 585 (explaining how first sale doctrine increases af-
fordability).  It also allows secondary markets to exist where consumers can
purchase used copies of works at a price lower than the price that the original
retailer charged. See id. at 586-87 (discussing role of secondary markets in increas-
ing affordability).  The first sale doctrine also allows rental markets to exist that
allow consumers to access a copy of a work for a limited time and for a lower price.
See id. at 587-88 (discussing ways that first sale doctrine increases affordability).
Finally, the first sale doctrine facilitates public lending. See id. at 588-90 (indicating
9
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availability of works by giving consumers access to works that the copyright
owner has stopped distributing.58  Third, it preserves the privacy of con-
sumers.59  These benefits help to achieve the best balance of interests be-
tween copyright owners and the public by protecting the public’s interest
in accessing copyrighted works without jeopardizing adequate protection
for the copyright owners.60
III. “ ‘TILL I COLLAPSE”61: HOW THE DIGITAL AGE THREATENS THE
BALANCE OF COPYRIGHT LAW
It is well recognized that the balance between the interests of copy-
right owners and the public is threatened by digital technology.62  Al-
though there are many reasons for this concern, this Note focuses on two
of them: increased infringement and marginalization of the first sale doc-
trine.63  From the perspective of copyright owners, technology has allowed
mass infringement that significantly violates their exclusive rights to copy
and distribute.64  From the perspective of the public, technology has di-
minished the first sale doctrine, limiting the traditional rights that con-
sumers acquire when they purchase a copy of a copyrighted work.65
that public libraries can purchase copies of work and then lend copy to public at
no direct charge).
58. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 15, at 895 (explaining how first sale
doctrine increases availability of works); Reese, supra note 56, at 593 (discussing
how first sale doctrine increases public availability of works by giving consumers
access to works that are out of print).
59. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 15, at 896 (explaining that first sale
doctrine protects consumer privacy by allowing consumers to transfer works with-
out permission from copyright owner); Reese, supra note 56, at 584 (listing mainte-
nance of privacy as one primary benefit of first sale doctrine).
60. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 15, at 892 (characterizing first sale
doctrine as limitation used to achieve balance between copyright owners’ rights
and consumers’ need for access).
61. EMINEM, ‘Till I Collapse, on THE EMINEM SHOW (Aftermath Records 2002).
62. See Liu, supra note 26, at 1254 (“The advent of digital technology and the
distribution of content over digital networks is disrupting the existing balance of
rights between copyright owners and users.”); Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note
15, at 891-92 (recognizing that digital works upset balance between interests of
copyright owners and consumers, making current first sale doctrine insufficient).
63. For a discussion of how the digital age has strained the balance of inter-
ests between copyright owners and the public, see infra notes 64-94 and accompa-
nying text.
64. See Calaba, supra note 49, at 7-9 (discussing how technology has led to
proliferation of infringement); Keller & Cunard, supra note 55, at 296 (“Online
technologies create new opportunities to copy and disseminate copyrighted
materials.”).
65. See Calaba, supra note 49, at 9-15 (discussing how first sale doctrine is di-
minished in digital world); Liu, supra note 26, at 1290-91 (discussing limitation of
first sale doctrine in context of software licensing); Perzanowski & Schultz, supra
note 15, at 901-07 (discussing how digital technology and distribution models are
marginalizing first sale doctrine); Long III, supra note 57, at 1184 (“[D]igital distri-
bution still remains an imperfect substitution, legally speaking, for tangible media
in terms of the consumer’s expectations because many of the rights afforded to
10
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A. Increased Infringement
Digital technology has made copyright infringement much simpler
than it was with older technologies.66  As a result, the rights of copyright
owners are significantly threatened.67  While it was possible for people or
entities to duplicate and distribute copyrighted works before the digital
age, such activities required “considerable skill, money and time.”68  To-
day, however, digital copies of works can be duplicated and shared with
anyone in the world through the Internet—all with a few clicks of a
mouse.69  Furthermore, digital files require almost no physical storage
space, and duplication does not degrade their quality.70
One of the primary ways that consumers infringe copyrights is
through the use of peer-to-peer file-sharing networks.71  The most famous
example of a peer-to-peer file-sharing website is the old version of Nap-
ster.72  Napster made files stored on users’ hard drives available for
downloading by other users through the Internet.73  In A&M Records, Inc.
consumers by copyright law, in relation to tangible media, are absent when
purchasing seemingly identical digital media.”).
66. See Calaba, supra note 49, at 7-9 (discussing how technology has made
copying and distribution of copyrighted works easier).
67. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 923
(2005) (discussing effect of peer-to-peer file sharing on potential infringement,
stating “the probable scope of copyright infringement is staggering”); Calaba,
supra note 49, at 7 (recognizing that ease of copying and distributing copyrighted
material with digital technology “potentially exposes copyright owners to tremen-
dous losses”).
68. See Calaba, supra note 49, at 7-8 (discussing how digital technology has
made copyrighted works easier to copy).  A century ago, copying a book necessarily
involved using a printing press or copying the book by hand. See id. at 7 (compar-
ing difficulty of duplicating and distributing copyrighted works before and after
digital technology).  Copying became less difficult in the 1980s with the introduc-
tion of technology like the photocopier and the VCR, but distribution of the cop-
ies was still costly because it “involved . . . physical delivery of each copy.” See id. at
8 (discussing how technology in 1980s made copying easier, but did not impact
distribution costs).
69. See id. (discussing ease of copying and distributing digital works).
70. See id. (discussing reasons for ease of piracy).
71. See Annemarie Bridy, Why Pirates (Still) Won’t Behave: Regulating P2P in the
Decade After Napster, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 565, 565-66 (2009) (stating that despite en-
forcement efforts, peer-to-peer file-sharing infringement continues on massive
scale).
72. See id. at 584 (referring to Napster as “famous test case” for litigation try-
ing to stop infringing uses of copyrighted works through peer-to-peer networks).
After the lawsuit, Napster became a legal subscription service, and, in 2011, was
acquired by Rhapsody. See id. at 565 (stating “Napster went legit years ago”); see
also Napster Services, Sites and Applications Terms and Conditions, NAPSTER, http://
home.napster.com/info/terms.html (last modified Sept. 7, 2010) (describing
terms of use for Napster’s subscription service and stating that copyright holders
license use of content to Napster).
73. See Calaba, supra note 49, at 28 (“Such software provides a centralized
exchange for file swapping and enables users from all over the world to meet on-
line, search each other’s hard drives for a desired file, and then upon locating it,
download the file.”).
11
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v. Napster, Inc.,74 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction that
prohibited Napster from continuing its service.75  The trial court had
found a preliminary injunction warranted because, among other things,
the plaintiffs had established a reasonable likelihood of success on the
merits for Napster’s liability for contributory infringement and vicarious
infringement.76
Although Napster and other file-sharing sites have been enjoined
from continuing their activities, peer-to-peer file sharing remains preva-
lent.77 The Economist reported that in 2008—seven years after the conclu-
sion of the Napster litigation—twenty songs were illegally downloaded for
every one song purchased legally.78  Therefore, the rights of copyright
owners continue to be threatened by peer-to-peer file sharing and other
methods of infringement.79
74. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
75. See id. at 1029 (holding that preliminary injunction required
modification).
76. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 920, 922
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (stating that plaintiffs established reasonable likelihood of success
on contributory infringement and vicarious infringement claims), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, 239 F.3d 1004.
77. See Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398, 409-10
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (granting summary judgment to plaintiffs on claims for induce-
ment of copyright infringement, common law infringement, and unfair competi-
tion claims).  The defendant, Lime Group, owned the peer-to-peer file-sharing
program “LimeWire.” See id. at 410-11 (describing factual background of case).
Grokster was another company that provided peer-to-peer file-sharing ser-
vices. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-
20 (2005) (describing Grokster’s peer-to-peer networks).  The Supreme Court va-
cated the court of appeals’ affirmation of the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for Grokster. See id. at 941 (summarizing holdings of case).  On remand,
summary judgment was granted for plaintiffs, finding the defendant liable for in-
ducement of copyright infringement. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (summarizing defen-
dant’s liability for inducement of copyright infringement).  Since 2007, the preva-
lence of peer-to-peer file sharing has decreased, but the practice is still widespread,
with estimates of 16 million users downloading music through peer-to-peer net-
works in the fourth quarter of 2010. See Press Release, NPD Group Inc., With
Limewire Shuttered, Peer-to-Peer Music File Sharing Declines Precipitously (Mar.
23, 2011), available at http://www.npd.com/press/releases/press_110323.html
(discussing prevalence of peer-to-peer file sharing in fourth quarter of 2010).
While people tend to focus on the sharing of music files, peer-to-peer networks are
used to share many different kinds of files, including files containing textbooks in
PDF format and movies. See Bridy, supra note 71, at 566-67 (describing continued
prevalence of file sharing).
78. See Bridy, supra note 71, at 566 (describing continued prevalence of file
sharing (citing Thanks, Me Hearties: Media Firms Find That Statistics On Internet Piracy
Can Be Rather Useful, ECONOMIST, July 17, 2008, http://www.economist.com/busi-
ness/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11751035)).
79. For a discussion of the threat of peer-to-peer file sharing to copyright own-
ers’ rights, see supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
12
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B. Marginalization of the First Sale Doctrine
Many scholars believe that technology has also negatively impacted
the public’s interest by limiting the application of the first sale doctrine.80
Unlike physical copies, transferring digital copies requires them to be
loaded into a computer’s random-access memory, which violates the copy-
right owner’s exclusive right to reproduction.81  Because transferring digi-
tal copies implicates the copyright owner’s reproduction right, an owner
of a digital copy cannot transfer the digital copy without committing copy-
right infringement.82
The protective measures taken by copyright owners and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) further frustrate the operation of the
first sale doctrine for digital works.83  Because infringement became so
easy in the digital world, copyright owners employed digital rights manage-
ment (DRM) technology to protect themselves from infringement.84
DRM technology is a general term that includes a variety of methods that
copyright owners use to restrict access to and use of digital copies of copy-
righted works.85  The DMCA makes the circumvention of DRM technol-
80. For a discussion of the ways the first sale doctrine is marginalized in the
digital age, see supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
81. See Liu, supra note 26, at 1266 (discussing how transfer of digital file re-
sults in multiple copies of work and stating “digital copy owners appear to have
hardly any rights at all, because nearly every use involves copying”); Perzanowski &
Schultz, supra note 15, at 902 (recognizing fact that using digital work requires
loading work into computer’s random-access memory (RAM) and that courts have
held this to be act of reproduction).
82. See Liu, supra note 26, at 1266 (explaining how transfer of digital works
violates copyright owners’ exclusive right to reproduction); Perzanowski & Schultz,
supra note 15, at 902 (explaining that transferring copy of digital work violates
exclusive right to reproduction because copy is created in RAM and other trans-
feree’s computer).
83. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 15, at 902-03 (stating that DMCA
threatens first sale doctrine); Peter Moore, Comment, Steal This Disk: Copy Protec-
tion, Consumers’ Rights, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
1437, 1441-42 (2003) (explaining how DRM technology and DMCA combine to
restrict consumers’ rights); Newman, supra note 14, at 862 (stating that most com-
mentators contend that DMCA restricts operation of first sale doctrine).
84. See Moore, supra note 83, at 1438 (discussing reasons for more protective
measures).
85. See Declan McCullagh & Milana Homsi, Leave DRM Alone: A Survey of Legis-
lative Proposals Relating to Digital Rights Management Technology and Their Problems,
2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 317, 318 (defining DRM as “a general term that refers to
technology-based protections that permit a rights holder to restrict a user’s access
to and control of digital content”).  For example, one common way that copyright
owners restrict access and use of a digital work is by “tethering” the use of a work to
a particular user or device. See Reese, supra note 56, at 613 (describing tethering
practices used in DRM technology); Long III, supra note 57, at 1184 (discussing
DRM technology and DMCA); Moore, supra note 83, at 1444-45 (describing tether-
ing practices).  DRM technology can also prevent the copying of physical copies of
copyrighted works. See Moore, supra note 83, at 1443-44 (describing encryption
technology on DVDs that prevent copying).
13
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ogy illegal.86  The DMCA was enacted to address the problems that digital
technology was causing for copyright owners.87  Nevertheless, many schol-
ars believe that the DMCA goes too far.88  They argue that it significantly
diminishes consumers’ rights under the first sale doctrine because it
makes circumvention illegal—even for non-infringing uses.89
Scholars have also suggested that marginalization of the first sale doc-
trine occurs through the practice of licensing the use of copyrighted works
to consumers.90  The first sale doctrine only applies to owners of copy-
righted works, not licensees.91  Therefore, as the practice of licensing digi-
tal works continues to grow, the first sale doctrine becomes more and
more irrelevant.92 F.B.T. Productions addresses the license-versus-sale de-
bate in the context of digital music.93  The remainder of this Note focuses
on the difference between licenses and sales and the effect of increased
86. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103(a), 112
Stat. 2860, 2863 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006)) (prohib-
iting circumvention of DRM technology); see also Reese, supra note 56, at 581-82
(describing provisions of DMCA).
87. See Calaba, supra note 49, at 18 (stating that Congress enacted DMCA
“[i]n response to modern technology and the corresponding concerns about
piracy in the digital era”); Liu, supra note 26, at 1261 (same).
88. See Calaba, supra note 49, at 19 (arguing that DMCA makes fair use doc-
trine “functionally infeasible”); Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 15, at 902-03
(explaining how DMCA restricts first sale doctrine); Moore, supra note 83, at 1441-
42 (explaining how DRM technology and DMCA combine to restrict consumers’
rights); Newman, supra note 14, at 862 (stating that most commentators contend
that DMCA restricts operation of first sale doctrine).
89. For a further discussion of scholars’ arguments that the DMCA goes too
far, see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
90. See NIMMER, supra note 12, § 1:110, at 1-274 to -276 (stating that first sale
doctrine does not apply to licenses and that licensing is increasing in digital age,
especially with computer software); Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 15, at 901-02
(explaining how licensing use of digital works, specifically software, has led to de-
creased application of first sale doctrine); Michael Seringhaus, E-Book Transactions:
Amazon “Kindles” the Copy Ownership Debate, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 147, 163-64 (2009)
(discussing how licensing digital content marginalizes first sale doctrine).
91. See United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that
first sale doctrine does not apply to licensees); Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note
15, at 901-02 (same); Seringhaus, supra note 90, at 160 (same).  The foundational
case for the first sale doctrine implicitly recognized that the rule that it was articu-
lating would not apply in the context of a license agreement. See Bobbs-Merrill Co.
v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908) (noting “[t]here is no claim . . . of contract
limitation, nor license agreement controlling the subsequent sales of the book”).
92. See Calaba, supra note 49, at 2 (describing how licensing frustrates first sale
doctrine); Long III, supra note 57, at 1191-92 (discussing use of licensing in digital
works and expressing concerns about its effects on first sale doctrine); Newman,
supra note 14, at 852 (stating that “copyright owners have used license agreements
as a weapon to eradicate the first sale doctrine”).
93. See F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir.
2010) (discussing difference between license and sale in context of Aftermath’s
contracts with third-party digital-music distributors), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1677
(2011).
14
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licensing on the balance that copyright law seeks to establish between the
interests of copyright owners and the public.94
IV. “NO LOVE”95 FOR LICENSES: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LICENSES
AND SALES AND CONCERNS ABOUT LICENSING
A. The Difference Between Licenses and Sales
Although categorizing a transaction as a license or a sale may seem
like a simple task, courts have taken many different approaches, leading to
a lack of settled case law on the issue.96  Furthermore, the different mean-
ings of the word “license”—depending on context—has led courts and
lawyers to conflate the different meanings, further muddying the license-
versus-sale debate.97  In F.B.T. Productions, the Ninth Circuit stated that
“license,” when used in the “ordinary sense of the word,” means “simply
‘permission to act.’”98  Yet in Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.,99 decided just seven
days later, the Ninth Circuit did not provide any definition of “license”;
instead, it immediately began reviewing case law to determine whether
Autodesk sold or licensed its software to consumers.100  In Vernor, the
94. For a discussion of the license-versus-sale debate and the effect of the in-
crease in licensing on the balance that copyright law seeks to establish between the
interests of copyright owners and the public, see infra notes 95-210 and accompa-
nying text.
95. EMINEM, No Love, on RECOVERY (Aftermath Records 2010).
96. See NIMMER, supra note 12, § 1:110, at 1-276 (“Cases that hold a licensee is
not an owner have approached the issue in three distinct ways.”).
97. See Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy Ownership:
First Sales and Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1887, 1931-33 (2010) (discuss-
ing equivocation of two different meanings of “license”).  When it is used as a
noun, the word “license” means a grant of rights that an owner has given to an-
other. See id. at 1931 (discussing meaning of “license” when used as noun in con-
text of copyright).  When it is used as a verb, however, “license” simply means “to
give permission or consent.” Id.  “License” is also sometimes used as a synonym of
“agreement” or “contract.” Id.  Perhaps the most confusing use of “license” is
when it is used to describe a transfer of property without transferring title. See id.
(discussing use of “license” in context of transferring software).  The many ways
that “license” is used causes “rampant confusion.” Id.
98. F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 964 (defining meaning of “license” in agreement
between Aftermath and F.B.T. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1304 (Philip Babcock Gove ed.,
2002 ed.))).
99. 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
100. See id. at 1108-11 (discussing Ninth Circuit’s case law regarding differ-
ence between license and sale).  The court focused on United States v. Wise, 550
F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977), and the “MAI trio” of cases. See id. at 1108-09 (summa-
rizing case law relating to license-versus-sale debate, including Wise and the MAI
trio: MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), Triad
Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995), superseded by statute, 17
U.S.C. § 117(c) (2006), as recognized in Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150
(9th Cir. 2011), and Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769 (9th
Cir. 2006)).
In Wise, the defendant was found guilty of criminal copyright infringement
because he sold film prints that he received from the copyright owners through
15
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plaintiff bought used copies of Autodesk’s AutoCAD Release 14 software
from a garage sale and tried to resell them on eBay.101  The court found
that Vernor was not entitled to resell the software because he was a licen-
see and reselling the software violated the terms of the license
agreement.102
The Vernor court held that a transaction is a license “where the copy-
right owner: (1) specifies that the user is granted a license; (2) signifi-
cantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software; and (3) imposes
notable use restrictions.”103  Despite this formulaic language, the court
distribution agreements. See Wise, 550 F.2d at 1183 (discussing holding of district
court).  However, the Ninth Circuit reversed two of the convictions because it de-
termined that the Government failed to prove an absence of a first sale for those
two counts. See id. at 1194 (reviewing which counts Government proved absence of
first sale and which it did not).  The court weighed five factors to determine if a
first sale had occurred in each agreement, none of which were dispositive. See
Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1103-04 (discussing standard that court in Wise used to deter-
mine whether first sale occurred).  These factors were “whether the agreement (a)
was labeled a license, (b) provided that the copyright owner retained title to the
prints, (c) required the return or destruction of the prints, (d) forbade duplica-
tion of prints, or (e) required the transferee to maintain possession of the prints
for the agreement’s duration.” Id. at 1108.
In the MAI trio of cases, the Ninth Circuit dealt with the license-versus-sale
issue in the context of the essential step defense to infringement. See id. at 1109
(discussing issue in MAI trio of cases).  The essential step defense allows a software
user to make a copy of a computer program without infringing on the copyright “if
the new copy is ‘created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer
program in conjunction with a machine and . . . is used in no other manner.’” Id.
at 1109 (alteration in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1)).  However, the
essential step defense only applies to owners of copies of the software, so the ability
to use the defense depends on whether the transaction is classified as a license or a
sale. See id. (discussing essential step defense under § 117(a)(1)).  To determine
whether the transaction was a sale and whether the defendants could therefore use
the essential step defense, the court in the MAI trio of cases considered whether
the transaction was called a license and if the terms significantly restricted the
ability to transfer. See id. at 1110 (discussing factors considered in MAI trio of cases
to determine whether transaction was license or sale).  In Vernor, the Ninth Circuit
tried to reconcile the holdings and reasoning of Wise and the MAI trio of cases. See
id. at 1111 (“Our holding reconciles the MAI trio and Wise, even though the MAI
trio did not cite Wise.”).
101. See id. at 1105 (discussing facts of case).  Autodesk claimed that the resale
of the software violated the software’s license agreement. See id. (discussing
Autodesk’s argument).  Although he was aware of the license agreement, Vernor
believed that he was not bound by its terms because he never agreed to those
terms, opened the sealed software packet, or installed the software. See id. (discuss-
ing Vernor’s argument).  Vernor brought an action for declaratory judgment
against Autodesk in order to establish that the resale of the software was not a
violation of Autodesk’s copyright because it was protected by the first sale doctrine.
See id. at 1106 (discussing procedural posture of case).  The district court granted
summary judgment to Vernor because it “interpreted Wise to hold that a first sale
occurs whenever the transferee is entitled to keep the copy of the work.” Id. at
1111.  The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded. See id. at 1116 (stating Ninth
Circuit’s holding).
102. See id. at 1111 (stating holding and reasoning).
103. Id.
16
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“did not conclude that these three elements were the only elements that
make a license transaction not a sale of a copy.”104  However, the court did
state clearly that if those three elements are present in a transaction, then
the transaction is a license.105
The Federal Circuit took an even less formulaic approach in DSC Com-
munications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc.106  In DSC Communications,
the court looked at all of the circumstances surrounding software transac-
tions to determine if they were licenses or sales.107  Even though each
copy of the software was transferred through a single payment that gave
the right to perpetual use and possession, the Federal Circuit held that the
104. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 1:110, at 1-278.2.
105. See id. (discussing court’s decision in Vernor). Vernor was applied in MDY
Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., another recent Ninth Circuit decision
addressing the difference between a license and a sale. See MDY Indus., LLC v.
Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 938 (9th Cir. 2010) (analyzing and applying
Vernor).  The issue in MDY Industries was whether consumers who played World of
Warcraft, a popular video game, were owners or licensees for the purpose of the
essential step doctrine. See id. (discussing issue of case).  Applying Vernor, the court
found that the players were licensees because the license agreement provided that
Blizzard retained title to the copy of the software and imposed significant transfer
restrictions. See id. at 938-39 (explaining reasoning of decision).  Because they
were licensees, they were not entitled to the essential step defense, and any time
the software was copied into the RAM of their computers in a way that violated the
terms of the license agreement, they were infringing on Blizzard’s copyright. See
id. at 939 (explaining holding).
106. 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  DSC and Pulse were competitors that
both manufactured digital-loop carrier systems for Regional Bell Operating Com-
panies (RBOCs) that allowed commercial telephone systems to run more effi-
ciently. See id. at 1357 (discussing facts of case).  DSC claimed, among other
things, that Pulse infringed its copyright in software that was used in one of its
products transferred to RBOCs. See id. (discussing DSC’s claims).  Pulse counter-
claimed that DSC infringed one of its patents. See id. (discussing Pulse’s claim).
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted Pulse’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law and dismissed all of DSC’s claims. See id. (discussing
district court’s holding for Pulse’s claims).  The district court based its decision on
the fact that the RBOCs were owners because they made a single payment for the
software that allowed the right of possession for an unlimited period. See id. at
1360.  The court then held a hearing for Pulse’s counterclaims, at which time both
parties moved for summary judgment. See id. at 1357 (discussing procedure of
case).  The court granted DSC’s motion, finding that it did not infringe Pulse’s
patent as a matter of law. See id. (discussing holding on summary judgment mo-
tions).  DSC appealed, challenging the district court’s grant of judgment as a mat-
ter of law against its original claims, and specifically, its holding that DSC’s transfer
of the software made the RBOCs owners of the software for purposes of the essen-
tial step doctrine. See id. at 1360 (discussing procedural posture of case); see also
Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1109 (defining essential step doctrine).
107. See DSC Commc’ns, 170 F.3d at 1361 (discussing reasons why transfer was
license rather than sale).  The court in DSC Communications criticized the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. for failing to ade-
quately distinguish between the ownership of a copyright and the ownership of
copies of the copyrighted material. See id. at 1360 (criticizing Ninth Circuit’s MAI
Systems Corp. decision).  As a result, the Federal Circuit declined to “adopt the
Ninth Circuit’s characterization of all licensees as non-owners.” Id.
17
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transactions were licenses and not sales.108  In reaching this conclusion,
the court examined the agreements transferring the software copies and
emphasized the notable restrictions on use and transfer of the software.109
DSC stands for the proposition that a transaction may not be a sale if the
terms of the transaction restrict the rights that owners would typically en-
joy—even if it looks like a sale because it involves a single payment for
perpetual use and possession.110
Other courts have taken a more categorical approach, holding that a
transferee is not an owner if the terms of the transfer provide that the
seller of the copy retains ownership.111  An even more direct approach
that courts have taken is simply holding that if the transaction is labeled a
license, the transferee is a licensee and not an owner of the copy.112  How-
ever, the most predominant approach is to examine the terms of the trans-
action to determine if the transferee has been granted the rights of a
licensee or an owner, regardless of whether the transaction is labeled as a
license or a sale.113
B. The Effect of Characterizing a Transaction as a License
Regardless of the approach that courts use to determine if a transac-
tion is a license or a sale, the characterization of a transaction as a license
has important implications for consumers and copyright owners.114  When
transactions are characterized as licenses, transferees become licensees
108. See id. at 1362 (stating holding for contributory infringement claim).
109. See id. at 1361-62 (examining limitations on RBOCs’ rights in agreements
with DSC).  The court noted that the agreements provided that DSC retained all
rights to the software, explicitly making the RBOCs licensees. See id. at 1361 (ex-
plaining reasoning of decision).  It also noted that the agreements limited the
RBOCs’ right to transfer the copies of the software and limited the use of the
software to DSC’s hardware. See id. (discussing reasons for holding).
110. See NIMMER, supra note 12, § 1:110, at 1-277 to -278 (discussing Federal
Circuit’s decision in DSC Communications).
111. See id. at 1-274, 1-274 n.7 (discussing more categorical approach that
some courts have taken in license-versus-sale debate, citing S.O.S., Inc., v. Payday,
Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989), as example).
112. See id. at 1-277, 1-277 n.9 (discussing labeling approach to license-versus-
sale issue, citing MAI Systems Corp. as example).
113. See id. at 1-277 (discussing most predominant approach that courts have
taken).  Although the labeling of a transaction as a license or a sale is not disposi-
tive, it is informative under this approach. See id. (examining user-rights approach
to license-versus-sale debate).  This was the approach taken in Vernor and DSC Com-
munications. See id. at 1-277 to -278.1 (discussing DSC Communications and Vernor
decisions).  For a discussion of Vernor and DSC Communications, see supra notes 99-
110 and accompanying text.
114. See NIMMER, supra note, § 1:110, at 1-274 (“Both aspects of first-sale doc-
trine (sections 109 and 117) apply only where the defendant is the owner of a copy
of the work . . . .”); see also Liu, supra note 26, at 1263 (stating that MAI decision,
characterizing transferees of software as licensees and therefore holding that es-
sential step defense did not apply, has potential to give “copyright owners broad
control, at least in theory, over nearly all computer-aided uses of copyrighted
works encoded in digital form”).
18
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and lose the ability to take advantage of the first sale doctrine.115  How-
ever, transferees do not lose the protection of the fair use doctrine, which
applies equally to licenses and sales.116  For copyright owners, the charac-
terization of a transaction as a license allows more control over consumers’
use of the product, which in turn gives copyright owners greater ability to
protect and enforce their rights.117
Although most cases dealing with this issue have been decided in the
context of computer software, there is no reason that the same distinctions
between a license and a sale—and the implications of those distinctions—
would not apply to the transfer of other copyrighted works.118  Indeed, in
F.B.T. Productions, the court applied the concepts that were developed in
the computer software cases to address the license-versus-sale debate in
the context of digital music.119  Digital versions of copyrighted works
other than software are increasingly being licensed to consumers, making
the implications of the license-sale distinction increasingly more relevant
to consumers and generating more scholarly debate.120
115. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy . . . is
entitled . . . to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy . . . .” (em-
phasis added)); § 117 (“[I]t is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a
computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy . . . of that
computer program . . . .” (emphasis added)); NIMMER, supra note 12, § 1:110, at 1-
275 to -276 (stating that first sale doctrine and its related defenses only apply to
owners of copies); Liu, supra note 26, at 1249 (explaining that first sale doctrine
applies once copyright owner has conveyed title to copy of copyrighted work); see
also Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 15, at 901-02 (discussing how licensing un-
dermines first sale doctrine because first sale only applies to owners of copies).
116. See Carver, supra note 97, at 1891 (“[N]o one needs a license to make a
fair use; everyone already has a right of fair use.”); Liu, supra note 26, at 1269
(“[Fair use] does not depend on any relationship (express or implied) between
the author and user.”).  For a discussion of the fair use doctrine, see supra notes 45-
48 and accompanying text.
117. See Calaba, supra note 49, at 10 (explaining that licenses provide copy-
right owners with contract remedies for breach of license agreements in addition
to copyright remedies for infringement).
118. See Liu, supra note 26, at 1346 (“[T]here is no reason to distinguish be-
tween digital copies of software programs and digital copies of other works.  In
both cases, the same issues of access are presented.”); Perzanowski & Schultz, supra
note 15, at 936 (arguing that Congress’s rationale for enacting § 117 applies
equally to all digitally encoded works, stating “any rigid distinction between com-
puter programs and digitally encoded data is something of an oversimplification”).
119. See F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 964-65 (9th
Cir. 2010) (discussing license-versus-sale issue with regard to digital copies of
sound recordings and citing, inter alia, Wall Data Inc. and MAI Systems Corp), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1677 (2011).  Another recent Ninth Circuit case applied the rea-
soning and rules of the computer software cases to the license-versus-sale debate in
regard to the transfer of physical CDs. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628
F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying rules and reasoning from computer-
software cases to transfer of physical CDs).
120. See, e.g., Amazon.com Kindle License Agreement and Terms of Use, AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=hp_left_sib?ie=
UTF8&nodeId=200506200 (last modified Sept. 28, 2011) (“Unless specifically indi-
cated otherwise, you may not sell, rent, lease, distribute, broadcast, sublicense, or
19
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The enormous popularity of services and products like Netflix, Ama-
zon’s e-books for the Kindle, and Spotify show that consumers are embrac-
ing the licensing model and may in fact prefer it to the sales model for
digital versions of copyrighted works.121  Despite the popularity of the li-
censing model, many scholars are concerned that it has severely upset the
otherwise assign any rights to the Digital Content or any portion of it to any third
party, and you may not remove or modify any proprietary notices or labels on the
Digital Content.”); see also Seringhaus, supra note 90, at 150 (stating that Amazon’s
e-books are not sold, but licensed, to consumers).  Further, the Kindle License
Agreement specifically states that “Digital Content is licensed, not sold, to you by
the Content Provider.” Id.  The increased licensing of digital works to consumers
can also be seen in the music and movie industries with the popularity of subscrip-
tion services. See Napster Services, Sites and Applications Terms and Conditions, supra
note 72 (“The Tracks and Materials are owned by Napster . . . .  [Y]our use of the
Tracks and Materials is subject to the Usage Rules discussed below.”); Terms of Use,
NETFLIX, https://signup.netflix.com/TermsOfUse?country=1&rdirfdc=true (last
modified Mar. 7, 2012) (“[W]e grant you a limited, non exclusive, non transfera-
ble, license to access the Netflix service . . . .  [N]o right, title or interest shall be
transferred to you.”); Spotify Terms and Conditions of Use, SPOTIFY, http://www.spo-
tify.com/us/legal/end-user-agreement/ (last modified Nov. 30, 2011) (“You are
granted a limited, non-exclusive, revocable license to make personal non-commer-
cial use of the Spotify Software Application . . . and to receive by stream . . . the
media content . . . .  You do not have a right to transfer or sublicense your rights
under this Agreement.”).  Even the video game industry is beginning to license the
use of video games for a monthly subscription fee through cloud computing. See
Doug Gross, Is ‘Cloud Computing’ the Future of Video Games?, CNN, June 16, 2010,
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-16/tech/e3.cloud.gaming_1_video-games-play
station-network-electronic-entertainment-expo?_s=PM:TECH (describing OnLive
video game streaming service).
121. See Brandon Griggs, Spotify Founder: Future of Music Is Access, Not Owner-
ship, CNN, July 21, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH/web/07/21/spotify.
fortune.brainstorm/index.html?iref=allsearch (discussing popularity of Spotify);
Verne G. Kopytoff, Shifting Online, Netflix Faces New Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 2010, at B1 (reporting on increased competition for Netflix’s streaming service
because of its popularity); Brian Stelter, For Netflix, Higher Earnings and a Milestone,
N.Y. TIMES MEDIA DECODER BLOG (Apr. 25, 2011, 4:25 PM), http://mediadecoder.
blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/for-netflix-higher-earnings-and-a-milestone/?scp=
7&sq=netflix%20sales&st=cse;%20ABC%20Article%20at%20 (stating that Netflix
has 23.6 million subscribers globally, gaining average of 1.1 million subscribers in
United States each month in first quarter of 2011).  Spotify is a music-streaming
service that offers a free ad-supported service and an ad-free service for a monthly
subscription fee. See Griggs, supra, (describing Spotify).  It was launched in Swe-
den in 2006 and currently has more than 10 million users in Europe. See id. (dis-
cussing Spotify’s beginnings).  Spotify has only recently reached the United States,
launching on July 14, 2011; however, its founder hopes to attract 50 million users
in the United States within a year. See id. (discussing Spotify’s launch in United
States).  Spotify differs from Pandora and other internet radio services because
users can listen to the specific songs they choose. See id. (describing Spotify’s ser-
vice).  Amazon also offers a music streaming service and Apple will launch one in
the fall of 2011. See id. (discussing Spotify’s competition).  Amazon’s Kindle and
the e-books that are read on it also continue to grow in popularity; indeed, Ama-
zon’s e-book sales have surpassed its sales of physical books. See Claire Cain Miller
& Julie Bosman, E-Books Outsell Print Books at Amazon, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2011, at
B2 (reporting that Amazon sold 105 e-books for every 100 hardcover and paper-
back books).
20
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balance between the public’s interest and the copyright owners’ interest
by allowing copyright owners to exercise potentially limitless control over
copies of their works.122  These concerns have led to many suggestions of
ways to revive the first sale doctrine in the digital world.123
V. “GOING THROUGH CHANGES”124: THE SUBSTANCE AND IMPACT OF
F.B.T. PRODUCTIONS, LLC V. AFTERMATH RECORDS
In F.B.T. Productions, the Ninth Circuit continued the trend toward
widespread acceptance of licensing by finding that the agreements be-
tween Universal Music Group and its digital distributors were licenses, de-
spite the fact that the transactions were never explicitly labeled as licenses
and that both parties treated them as sales.125  Section A of this Part will
122. See Calaba, supra note 49, at 10 (“The use of license agreements to abro-
gate consumers’ rights raised concerns that the software industry was obtaining too
much power and becoming unduly repressive.”); Carver, supra note 97, at 1895
(“[I]f copyright owners can, through carefully worded EULAs, both retain title to
copies of their copyrighted works and forbid the use of those copies in conjunc-
tion with third-party software on pain of license termination, then copyright own-
ers can control those external markets with the stroke of a pen.”); Liu, supra note
26, at 1290-91 (“If mass-market shrink-wrap licenses become the norm and are
found enforceable, then the scope and application of the first sale doctrine may be
greatly limited with respect to digital copies.”); Winston, supra note 14, at 93
(“[I]ntellectual property owners increasingly choose to license products that em-
body their intellectual property and use privately-legislated licenses to augment
their intellectual property rights and circumvent publicly-legislated restrictions.”).
123. See, e.g., Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 15 (arguing that first sale doc-
trine is part of larger concept of copyright exhaustion and that exhaustion helps
solve problems that digital works cause for copyright).  While the first sale doctrine
only restricts the copyright owner’s distribution right, the principle of copyright
exhaustion would apply to the reproduction right and the right to prepare deriva-
tive works as well. See id. at 892 (discussing copyright exhaustion).  This would
allow consumers to reproduce or prepare a derivative of the copy of the digital
work to the extent that it is “necessary to enable the use, preservation, or aliena-
tion of that particular copy or any lawful reproduction of it.” Id.  Therefore, con-
sumers could transfer their copy of a digital work to another person by copying it
and sending the copy to another person, as long as the first person deletes the
original copy after sending the transferred copy. See id. at 938 (explaining how
exhaustion allows transfer of digital copies through “forward and delete” method).
While the first sale doctrine on its face does not allow this practice because it vio-
lates the reproduction right of the copyright owner, the exhaustion principle al-
lows this activity and preserves the benefits of the first sale doctrine. See id. at 937-
38 (explaining how exhaustion allows transfer and how it would “facilitate the ben-
efits of first sale”).  Another approach that scholars have taken is to call for Con-
gress to take legislative action. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 14, at 866 (arguing
that Congress must pass legislation to ensure that first sale doctrine is applied in
digital age).  Another approach that scholars have taken is to suggest compulsory
licensing schemes. See Masur, supra note 15, at 40 (stating that one solution to
rampant infringement that has received attention is collective-rights licensing,
which would pay artists royalties from fees paid by users at Internet service pro-
vider level).
124. EMINEM, Going Through Changes, on RECOVERY (Aftermath Records 2010).
125. For a full discussion of F.B.T. Productions, see infra notes 129-74 and ac-
companying text.
21
Uetz: The Same Song and Dance: F.B.T. Productions, LLC v. Aftermath Rec
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-1\VLR106.txt unknown Seq: 22 17-MAY-12 9:35
198 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57: p. 177
summarize the facts of the case.126  Section B will explain the court’s rea-
soning for its holding.127  Finally, section C will discuss the likely impact of
the court’s decision and the trend toward acceptance of license agree-
ments in copyright law.128
A. The Facts
In 2007, F.B.T. filed suit in the Central District of California against
Aftermath, a subsidiary of UMG Recordings.129  F.B.T.’s first contract with
Aftermath transferred the exclusive recording services of Eminem to After-
math.130  Under the Records Sold provision of that agreement, F.B.T. was
to receive between twelve and twenty percent of the adjusted retail price of
all “full price records sold in the United States . . . through normal retail
channels.”131  The agreement further stated, under the Masters Licensed
provision, that F.B.T would receive fifty percent of Aftermath’s total re-
ceipts from “masters licensed by [UMG] to others for their manufacture
and sale of records or for any other uses.”132  Beginning in 2001, UMG
executed many agreements with digital-download distributors that allowed
Eminem’s recordings to be sold in digital format and permanently
downloaded to users’ computers.133
In the contract, “master” is defined as a “recording of sound, without
or with visual images, which is used or useful in the recording, production
or manufacture of records.”134  The terms “licensed” and “normal retail
channels” were not defined.135  Despite multiple amendments to the con-
tract, digital downloads were not explicitly addressed in the contract until
126. For a discussion of the facts of F.B.T. Productions, see infra notes 129-46
and accompanying text.
127. For a discussion of the court’s reasoning in F.B.T. Productions, see infra
notes 147-64 and accompanying text
128. For a discussion of the impact of the court’s decision in F.B.T. Produc-
tions, see infra notes 165-74 and accompanying text.
129. See F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, No. CV 07-3314 PSG
(MANx), 2009 WL 137021, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2009) (stating that complaint
was filed on May 21, 2007), rev’d, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 1677 (2011); see also F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 958 (stating that UMG Record-
ings, Inc. is Aftermath’s parent company); McPherson, supra note 2, at 10 (stating
that Aftermath Records is co-owned by Interscope Records, UMG Recordings, Inc.,
and Andre Young, who performs as “Dr. Dre”).
130. See F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 965 (discussing F.B.T.’s first contract with
Aftermath Records).
131. Id. at 961 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. See id. at 962 (describing UMG’s agreements with digital distributors).
These contracts included agreements that allowed Eminem’s sound recordings to
be sold as permanent downloads and agreements with cell phone companies that
allowed Eminem’s sound recordings to be sold as mastertones, which are used as
ring tones for cell phones. See id. (detailing agreements between UMG and digital
distributors).
134. Id. at 961-62 (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. Id. at 962.
22
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2004.136  At that time, an amendment was added specifying that perma-
nent-download sales would be considered part of net sales for the purpose
of determining escalations.137  Escalations are increases in the royalty rate
based on the number of sales.138
F.B.T. conducted a royalty audit in 2006 and discovered that it was
being paid the royalty rate for permanent downloads under the Records
Sold provision of the contract.139  However, F.B.T. believed that it should
have been receiving the Masters Licensed provision rate for digital
downloads.140  If that were true, it would mean that F.B.T. was being se-
verely underpaid.141  F.B.T. filed suit shortly after conducting the audit.142
Aftermath and F.B.T. both filed motions for summary judgment and
the District Court for the Central District of California denied both mo-
tions, finding that the agreements were “reasonably susceptible to more
than one interpretation.”143  At trial, a jury ruled in favor of Aftermath
and F.B.T. appealed.144  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed, finding that the district court erred in denying F.B.T.’s motion for
summary judgment because the agreements between UMG and the digital
distributors unambiguously fell under the Masters Licensed provision of
the contract between F.B.T. and Aftermath.145  The Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari on March 21, 2011, and denied rehearing on May 16,
2011.146
136. See id. at 962 (detailing various amendments to contract and describing
how digital downloads were addressed in 2004).
137. See McPherson, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing 2004 amendments to con-
tract).  In 2000, F.B.T. and Aftermath agreed to amend the 1998 contract to create
a direct relationship between Eminem and Aftermath and make F.B.T. a passive-
income participant. See id. (discussing contractual history of parties).  In 2003,
F.B.T. and Aftermath terminated the 1998 contract and entered into a new agree-
ment; however, the Records Sold and Masters Licensed provisions remained the
same. See id. (discussing 2003 agreement between parties).
138. See id. (explaining meaning of escalation clause).
139. See id. (discussing events leading up to litigation).
140. See id. (describing disagreement between F.B.T. and Aftermath).
141. See id. (discussing effects of characterizing agreements with digital dis-
tributors as licenses).  Getting paid according to the Masters Licensed provision
would have increased F.B.T.’s royalty rate from between twelve and twenty percent
to fifty percent. See id. (discussing characterization’s effect on royalty rates).  This
increase in royalty percentage could mean that F.B.T. would receive in excess of
two dollars more for every album sold. See id. at 10 (discussing effect of increased
royalty rate).  For an artist like Eminem, who sells millions of albums, F.B.T. would
stand to gain millions of dollars from the increased rate. See id. (noting how F.B.T.
would stand to gain from increased rate).
142. See id. at 11 (discussing events leading up to litigation).
143. F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, No. CV 07-3314 PSG (MANx),
2009 WL 137021, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2009), rev’d, 621 F.3d 958, cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 1677 (2011).
144. See F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 962 (discussing procedure of case).
145. See id. at 967 (stating holding).
146. See Aftermath Records, 131 S. Ct. 1677 (denying certiorari), reh’g denied, 131
S. Ct. 2482 (2011).
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B. The Analysis
The Ninth Circuit was asked to answer the question of whether the
Masters Licensed provision of the contract unambiguously applied to
UMG’s contracts with digital distributors.147  The district court denied
F.B.T.’s motion for summary judgment.148  Its determination was based on
extrinsic evidence that, in the court’s opinion, made the contract reasona-
bly susceptible to either interpretation.149
However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of sum-
mary judgment, finding that the Masters Licensed provision unambigu-
147. See F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 964 (discussing F.B.T.’s motion for summary
judgment that court is reviewing).  If the contract was ambiguous, granting sum-
mary judgment would be inappropriate because there would have been a genuine
issue of material fact for a fact finder to determine. See F.B.T. Prods., 2009 WL
137021 at *4 (discussing standard of review for summary judgment).  However, if
the contract was unambiguous, the Masters Licensed provision would have applied
to permanent downloads and mastertones as a matter of law. See F.B.T. Prods., 621
F.3d at 964 (discussing consequences of determining that contract was
unambiguous).
148. See F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 964 (discussing district court’s decision).
149. See F.B.T. Prods., 2009 WL 137021 at *4 (discussing standard for deter-
mining whether contract is ambiguous).  There was no evidence of negotiations
between the parties as to how they intended to treat permanent downloads and
mastertones. See id. (discussing reasons for deciding that agreement was suscepti-
ble to multiple interpretations).  However, F.B.T. submitted evidence that the
agreements with digital distributors were licenses because UMG retained owner-
ship and received recurring benefits. See id. at *5 (discussing UMG’s agreement
with Apple Computer, Inc. to sell music on iTunes music store, but reserving right
to “withdraw any of its sound recordings” and receive payment according to vol-
ume of songs or albums sold).  Aftermath argued that the Masters Licensed provi-
sion traditionally only applied to “ancillary uses” of the master recordings, such as
the use of a song in a movie or a compilation album. Id.  Therefore, the parties
intended the Masters Licensed provision to be limited to such traditional applica-
tions. See id. (explaining Aftermath’s argument).  Both parties also argued that
industry custom supported their respective interpretations of the contract. See id.
at *6 (discussing parties’ arguments).  The court found “that neither party [ ] con-
clusively established that ‘custom and practice’ mandates a particular interpreta-
tion of the Masters Licensed provision.” Id.  Aftermath also argued that the
escalation provision of the 2004 amendment to the contract explicitly mentions
permanent downloads as “Sales of Albums” and treats them as such for purposes of
net sales numbers, which are used to determine escalation in royalty percentage.
See id. (explaining Aftermath’s arguments).  However, F.B.T. claimed that After-
math’s interpretation of the escalation provision did not resolve the ambiguity be-
cause the Masters Licensed provision “explicitly references ‘the manufacture and
sale of records’ by third parties.” Id.  Aftermath also argued that the Records Sold
provision unambiguously applied to permanent downloads because a “record” is
defined “as ‘all forms of reproductions . . . manufactured and distributed primarily
for home use.’” Id. at *7 (citation omitted).  Furthermore, in arguing that the
contracts granted it expansive rights, Aftermath pointed to the fact that the agree-
ments gave them “the right to sell ‘records’ ‘in any [or] all forms of media now
known and hereinafter developed.’” Id. (citation omitted).  The district court de-
nied summary judgment, finding that the extrinsic evidence was conflicting and
that the contract was reasonably susceptible to either party’s interpretation. See id.
(stating holding).
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ously applied to UMG’s contracts for permanent downloads and
mastertones with digital distributors.150  The Ninth Circuit conceded that
the provision was broad, but maintained that it was not unclear or ambigu-
ous.151  The court stated that the ordinary meaning of “license” is “simply
‘permission to act’” and that Aftermath gave third parties permission to
use its master recordings to produce and sell permanent downloads and
mastertones.152  Therefore, the contracts with the digital distributors were
licenses under the ordinary definition of the word.153
The court went on to explain why the contracts between UMG and
the digital distributors were licenses under copyright law.154  It empha-
sized that Aftermath never conveyed title to the recording because it “re-
served the right to regain possession of the files at any time.”155  The court
stated that “it is well settled that where a copyright owner transfers a copy
of copyrighted material, retains title, limits the uses to which the material
may be put, and is compensated periodically based on the transferee’s ex-
ploitation of the material, the transaction is a license.”156  The Ninth Cir-
cuit was convinced that UMG’s transactions with digital distributors fit that
description.157
Next, the court explained why it considered the contract unambigu-
ous.158  Aftermath argued that the escalation clause from the 2004 amend-
ment showed that the parties intended the royalty rate for permanent
downloads to be calculated according to the Records Sold provision.159
The court rejected the argument because the escalation clause, by its plain
language, only counted permanent downloads as sales for purposes of es-
calations and said nothing about royalty rates.160
Aftermath also argued that industry custom and the course of per-
formance of these specific contracts favored its interpretation of the con-
tract.161  The court rejected these arguments because permanent
150. See F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 967 (summarizing holding).
151. See id. at 964 (discussing whether contract is ambiguous).
152. See id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED, supra note 98, at 1304).
153. See id. (applying ordinary definition of “license” to contracts).
154. See id. at 964-66 (discussing how agreements with third parties are unam-
biguously licenses under copyright law).
155. Id. at 965.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 965-66 (characterizing UMG’s contracts as licenses).
158. See id. at 966 (rejecting Aftermath’s arguments that contract was
ambiguous).
159. See id. (discussing Aftermath’s escalation-clause argument).
160. See id. (discussing Aftermath’s argument that escalation clause of 2004
amendment showed that royalties for permanent downloads should be calculated
according to Records Sold provision).
161. See id. (discussing Aftermath’s argument that Masters Licensed provision
had been applied “‘only to compilation records and incorporation into movies, TV
shows, and commercials’”).
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downloads and mastertones had only recently come into existence.162
Therefore, the application of the contract terms to permanent downloads
and mastertones could not have been contemplated when the contract was
signed.163  By rejecting Aftermath’s arguments, the court supported its
finding that the contract was unambiguous and that F.B.T. was due the
royalty rate according to the Masters Licensed provision of the contract.164
C. The Impact
The immediate impact of the Ninth Circuit’s decision is clear:
Eminem and artists with similar provisions in their contracts will receive
greater royalties for sales of permanent downloads and mastertones.165
Despite UMG’s contention that the holding is limited to this one contract
with unique language, the decision will almost certainly affect many more
artists with “very similar if not identical language” in their contracts.166  In
fact, the Ninth Circuit’s decision may already be affecting lawsuits by art-
ists with similar claims.167  In March 2011, the Allman Brothers reached a
162. See id. (rejecting industry-custom argument because there was no indica-
tion that parties intended to confine contract to state of industry in 1998).
163. See id. (rejecting industry-custom and course-of-performance argu-
ments).  Because the technologies were so new, the court reasoned that past appli-
cation of the Masters Licensed provision was irrelevant to determining how it
would apply to permanent downloads and mastertones. See id. (discussing reasons
for rejecting Aftermath’s arguments).  The court also rejected Aftermath’s argu-
ment that F.B.T. interpreted the contract in the same way by never objecting to the
royalties it was receiving before 2006. See id. (rejecting argument because F.B.T.
did not audit royalty statements until 2006, when it discovered that royalties were
being paid under Records Sold provision, and concluding that F.B.T’s actions
prior to that discovery were irrelevant).  F.B.T. did not have a duty to perform an
audit before then, so Aftermath could not use its lack of objection to the royalty
rates to prove how F.B.T. interpreted the contract. See id. at 966-67 (explaining
why F.B.T.’s prior actions could not be construed as endorsement of Aftermath’s
interpretation).
164. See id. at 967 (discussing holding).
165. See McPherson, supra note 2, at 10 (stating that difference in royalties
“could be in excess of $2.00 per album” and “the difference could be worth mil-
lions of dollars”); id. at 13 (discussing potential impact of F.B.T. Productions deci-
sion on recording artists).  However, it is worth noting that most new artists have
provisions in their contracts that specifically address how permanent downloads
will be treated for royalty purposes. See Ben Sisario, Eminem Lawsuit May Raise Pay
for Older Artists, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/28/
business/media/28eminem.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2&ref=eminem (noting lim-
ited impact of F.B.T. lawsuit on more recent contracts because “record companies
have revised most of their contracts to include digital sales among an artist’s re-
cord royalties” since the early 2000s).  Nevertheless, it will almost certainly affect
older artists whose contracts were written before the advent of digital downloads.
See id. (“Many older artists, however, whose contracts predate digital music and
have not been renegotiated, stand to profit significantly from the decision.”).
166. See McPherson, supra note 2, at 13 (discussing impact of F.B.T.
Productions).
167. For a further discussion of similar suits affected by the outcome in F.B.T.
Productions, see infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
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settlement agreement with Sony BMG Music Entertainment after five years
of litigation involving almost identical issues.168  Likewise, the estate of re-
cording artist Rick James had similar claims against UMG and filed suit
only days after the Supreme Court denied certiorari for F.B.T.
Productions.169
While these lawsuits show the immediate impact of F.B.T. Productions
on recording artists and the music industry, its long-term impact may be
even more significant.170  Despite scholarly concern about licensing in the
digital age, F.B.T. Productions fuels the approval of licenses and the willing-
ness to enforce license agreements in modern copyright law by declaring
that the agreements at issue were unambiguously licenses—even though
F.B.T. and Aftermath were treating the transactions as sales for most other
purposes.171  Although the contracts at issue in F.B.T. Productions were
agreements between the record label and digital distributors, the court’s
reasoning can be applied in the consumer context as well.172  As both
168. See Sisario, supra note 165 (discussing Allman Brothers lawsuit that raised
similar issues).  The Allman Brothers case was a class action suit that included the
bands Cheap Trick and Elmo & Patsy as plaintiffs. See Amended Class Action Com-
plaint at 4-5, Allman v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, No. 1:06-cv-03252-GBD (S.D.N.Y.
June 10, 2006), 2006 WL 2307598 (identifying plaintiffs).  The plaintiffs in that
case similarly claimed that their music was licensed to digital distributors and they
were therefore owed a greater percentage of royalties than they had been receiv-
ing. See id. at 2 (discussing claims).  Despite five years of litigation prior to the
Ninth Circuit’s decision, the parties reached a settlement in March 2011, a rela-
tively short time after the Ninth Circuit handed down its decision in F.B.T. Produc-
tions. See Sisario, supra note 165 (discussing Allman Brothers lawsuit).  The
Youngbloods also sued Sony BMG for similar reasons and that suit was settled on
the same day as the Allman Brothers action. See Class Action Complaint Demand
for Jury Trial at 2, Youngbloods v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, No. 07 CV 2394
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2007), 2007 WL 1368571 (discussing claims); Letter from
Jonathan M. Sperling, Covington & Burling LLP, to Magistrate Judge Kevin Na-
thaniel Fox (Mar. 11, 2011) (informing court of settlement agreement on both
matters).  Recording artist George Clinton attempted to rely on F.B.T. Productions,
but the court distinguished that case because it did not address Clinton’s main
problem—that he did not object to the payment of the royalties in a timely man-
ner. See Clinton v. Universal Music Grp., No. CV 07-672 PSG (JWJx), 2011 WL
3501818, at *5 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2011) (explaining why F.B.T. Productions did
not control).
169. See Tamera H. Bennett, Rick James Estate’s Class-Action Suit Against Univer-
sal: An Entertainment Attorney Weighs In, BILLBOARD (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.bill
board.biz/bbbiz/industry/record-labels/rick-james-estate-s-class-action-suit-
against-1005122802.story (discussing lawsuit filed by Rick James’s estate).
170. For a discussion of F.B.T. Productions’ effect on the acceptance of li-
censes, see infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
171. For a discussion of the scholarly disapproval of licenses, see supra notes
122-23 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the facts and reasoning of the
Ninth’s Circuit’s decision in F.B.T. Productions, see supra notes 129-64 and accom-
panying text.
172. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2010) (dis-
tinguishing licenses and sales in context of consumer’s purchase of software);
Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 15, at 906-07 (discussing effects of licensing on
consumers); Seringhaus, supra note 90, at 155 (discussing license-versus-sale dis-
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courts and consumers increasingly accept licensing arrangements, con-
sumers must continue to adjust to the different set of rights that they enjoy
under them.173  Nevertheless, the traditional balance between the public
interest and the copyright owner’s interest must be preserved.174
VI. “SAME SONG AND DANCE”175: CONCLUSION
Most legal scholars fear that, as licensing increases, consumer rights
will be severely limited and copyright owners will have essentially unlim-
ited control over their works, thus upsetting the balance of interests that
copyright law strives to achieve.176  Despite these concerns, there are rea-
sons to believe that licensing effectively preserves the traditional bal-
ance.177  The digital world still allows infringement on a massive scale and
that infringement remains a significant threat to the rights of copyright
owners.178  Licensing can provide further protection of those rights.179
Furthermore, licensing preserves the primary benefits of the first sale doc-
trine because it increases the affordability and availability of digital
works.180  Therefore, increased licensing does not upset the balance of the
interests of copyright owners and the public.181
Despite the ruling in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., peer-to-peer
file sharing and Internet piracy remain prevalent.182  The Recording In-
dustry Association of America (RIAA) reports that since peer-to-peer file
sharing emerged, music sales have dropped forty-seven percent in the
United States.183  The RIAA also reports that about 30 billion songs were
downloaded illegally from 2004 through 2009, and, consequently, consum-
ers in the United States only paid for a reported thirty-seven percent of the
tinctions in context of consumers’ purchase of e-books, stating that consumers are
not usually aware of “vastly different transactional status” of licenses and sales).
173. For a discussion of the differences between rights associated with licenses
and sales, see supra notes 96-123 and accompanying text.
174. For a discussion of how the balance will be preserved, see infra notes 182-
210 and accompanying text.
175. EMINEM, Same Song and Dance, on RELAPSE (Aftermath Records 2009).
176. For a further discussion of the scholarly concern about the increase of
licensing, see supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
177. For a discussion of the ways in which licensing preserves the balance of
copyright law, see infra notes 182-210 and accompanying text.
178. For a discussion of the effect of mass copyright infringement on the in-
dustry, see infra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
179. For a discussion of how licensing allows more control for copyright own-
ers, see infra note 189 and accompanying text.
180. For a discussion of how licensing can preserve the benefits of the first
sale doctrine, see infra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
181. For an explanation of how licensing preserves the balance of copyright
law, see infra notes 182-210 and accompanying text.
182. For a discussion of the continued prevalence of peer-to-peer file sharing,
see supra note 77-78 and accompanying text.
183. See Scope of the Problem, RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?
content_selector=piracy-online-scope-of-the-problem (last visited Mar. 30, 2012)
(reporting internet piracy statistics).
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music they acquired in 2009.184  Frontier Economics estimated that, in
2008, Internet users in the United States consumed between $7 and $20
billion dollars worth of digitally pirated recorded music.185
As a result, music companies have had to cut thousands of jobs and
are unable to sign, develop, and promote as many new artists.186  These
statistics, and similar statistics from other industries, show that copyright
owners still need more protection in order to adequately safeguard their
interests and to preserve the incentive to create.187  In fact, the RIAA spe-
cifically recognized the diminished “incentive for the aspiring artist to
make music a full time professional career.”188  Licensing digital copies of
music is a way for copyright owners to maintain more control over their
works and to protect their interests because it gives them contract reme-
dies in addition to copyright remedies.189
Licensing can also increase the affordability and availability of digital
works.190  Two of the primary benefits of the first sale doctrine are in-
creased affordability and availability of copyrighted works.191  Therefore,
as licensing increases, scholars fear that these benefits will be lost because
the first sale doctrine does not apply to licenses.192  However, licensing
copyrighted works to consumers has actually resulted in the same benefits
as the first sale doctrine.193  For example, Spotify and Netflix make huge
libraries of content available to consumers through licenses.194  The vast
184. See id. (reporting number of songs illegally downloaded on file-sharing
networks).
185. See FRONTIER ECON., ESTIMATING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IM-
PACTS OF COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY 57 (2011), available at http://www.iccwbo.
org/uploadedFiles/BASCAP/Pages/Global%20Impacts%20-%20Final.pdf (re-
porting results of study analyzing economic impact of illegally downloaded music
in United States).
186. See Scope of the Problem, supra note 183 (discussing impact of internet
piracy on music industry).
187. See id. (discussing how losses to music companies due to piracy result in
diminished opportunities to develop and promote artists).  The movie industry has
felt the effects of piracy as well. See Frank Ahrens, Hollywood Says Piracy Has Ripple
Effect, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2006, at D5 (discussing impact of piracy on movie
industry).
188. Scope of the Problem, supra note 183.
189. See Calaba, supra note 49, at 10 (discussing how licensing gives copyright
owners more control over their works).
190. For a further discussion of how licensing can increase affordability and
availability of copyrighted works, see infra notes 193-201 and accompanying text.
191. For a further discussion of affordability and access as benefits of the first
sale doctrine, see supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
192. For a further discussion of scholars’ concerns over the marginalization of
first sale doctrine, see supra notes 80-94 and accompanying text.
193. For a discussion of how licensing practices have increased affordability
and availability of music, see infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
194. See Griggs, supra note 121 (discussing Spotify’s service).  Spotify gives sub-
scribers unlimited access to about 15 million songs. See id. (discussing Spotify’s
service).  Netflix gives users access to more than 20,000 movies and television
shows that can be streamed online and about 100,000 DVDs that can be received
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majority of people could not afford to purchase every song on Spotify or
every movie on Netflix, but individuals can access all of that content for a
relatively low monthly fee.195
The iTunes model also increases the affordability and availability of
copyrighted works.196  iTunes allows consumers to download one song at a
time for about one dollar.197  Before iTunes, consumers were generally
forced to buy full-length albums in order to access the one song they really
wanted.198  Now, consumers can save money by purchasing a license to the
individual songs they want, rather than being forced to buy full-length al-
bums.199  This allows consumers to spend the saved money on more mu-
sic, thereby increasing the availability of music to consumers.200
Therefore, the iTunes’s licensing model also achieves the same benefits
that have historically been attributed to the first sale doctrine.201
through the mail. See Verne G. Kopytoff, A Cheaper Plan at Netflix Offers Films for
Online Only, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2010, at B2 (discussing Netflix’s service).
195. See Overview, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/get-spotify/overview/
(last visited Mar. 30, 2012) (providing plans that Spotify offers).  Spotify offers un-
limited access to its content on an Internet-connected computer for $4.99 per
month. See id. (describing various plans).  For $9.99 per month, users gain access
to Spotify’s service through a cellular phone with Internet access and the ability to
download a limited number of songs that can be accessed without an Internet
connection. See id. (describing various plans).
Netflix offers a variety of monthly subscription plans. See Michael Liedtke,
Preparing for the Netflix Price Increase, USA TODAY, Aug. 31, 2011, http://www.usa
today.com/tech/news/story/2011-08-31/Preparing-for-the-Netflix-price-increase/
50205346/1 (discussing recent price increase for Netflix subscriptions).  The least
expensive plans are about $8 per month for unlimited streaming, $8 per month
for one DVD at a time through the mail, and $16 per month for unlimited stream-
ing and one DVD at a time through the mail. See id. (discussing pricing of Netflix’s
plans).
196. Although iTunes insists that its content is sold, it has been argued that
iTunes’s content is actually licensed to consumers because of the restrictions on
uses and transfers that are imposed. See, e.g. Winston, supra note 14, at 97 (explain-
ing how iTunes products are more like licenses than sales); see also Terms and Condi-
tions, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/terms.html (last updated
Oct. 12, 2011) (setting forth terms and conditions for iTunes Store, stating “Usage
Rules” for purchased content, including limitations on use and transfer of prod-
ucts purchased on iTunes).
197. See Randy Lewis, Steve Jobs Revolutionized the Music Industry, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 2011, http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/news/music/la-et-jobs-mu-
sic-20111007,0,653159.story (discussing impact of iTunes giving consumers ability
to purchase individual tracks).
198. See Mark Guarino, Three Ways iTunes, and Its 10 Billion in Sales, Changed
Music Industry, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 26, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.
com/USA/Society/2010/0226/Three-ways-iTunes-and-its-10-billion-in-sales-
changed-music-industry (discussing effect iTunes had on music industry).
199. See id. (discussing decline of full-length albums and rise of portable
music).
200. See id. (discussing affordability of purchasing single songs on iTunes).
201. For a further discussion of availability and affordability as benefits of first
sale doctrine, see supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, increased licensing will not upset the balance of copy-
right law because the first sale doctrine still applies to sales of physical
copies of copyrighted works.202  Physical copies of movies, music, and
books are still available for consumers to purchase; in fact, physical copies
still make up the majority of purchases of movies, music, and books.203  In
this way, consumers that value the ability to transfer copies of copyrighted
works can buy physical copies and the first sale doctrine will live on.204
Copyright law seeks to balance the interests of copyright owners and
the public by preserving the incentive for copyright owners to create works
of art and maximizing public access to those works.205  In the digital con-
text, the ease of infringement and its effects on industries that rely on
copyrighted works cannot be underestimated.206  As a result of infringe-
ment, copyright owners need extra protection to preserve the incentive to
create.207  Licensing can offer that protection by giving copyright owners
202. For a further discussion of the first sale doctrine, see supra notes 49-54
and accompanying text.
203. See Guarino, supra note 198 (discussing percentage of music sales that
were physical CDs).  Although digital sales continue to increase as physical sales
continue to decline, the latter still accounted for sixty-four percent of total music
sales in 2010. See id. (discussing percentage of 2010 music sales that were physical
copies).  Also, physical copies of movies still represent a greater percentage of total
movie sales than digital copies, with seventy-five percent of consumers still prefer-
ring the former in 2011. See Ian Paul, DVD Death Watch: Sales Drop 20 Percent, TODAY
@ PCWORLD BLOG (May 4, 2011, 7:49 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/
227062/dvd_death_watch_sales_drop_20_percent.html (reporting that seventy-
five percent of Americans still prefer physical copies of movies, according to study
by NPD Group). Although e-book sales are increasing, physical books are still out-
selling e-books, as only seven percent of adults with Internet access read e-books.
See Ned Potter, Amazon as a ‘Netflix for Books’? How Reading Changes, ABC NEWS,
Sept. 13, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/amazon-kindle-future-books-
publishing-authors-jk-rowling/story?id=14502605 (reporting that although e-books
are growing in number, only seven percent of adults with Internet access read
them).
204. For a discussion of the availability of physical copies of copyrighted
works, see supra note 203 and accompanying text.  It is important to note that this
part of the analysis does not apply to software because there is no physical alterna-
tive to software; software must be copied onto a computer in order to function. See
Winston, supra note 14, at 100-01 (discussing how differences between software
and other copyrighted works contributed to acceptance of licensing model for
software).  Software is also different because consumers do not have a precon-
ceived notion of the rights that they receive when they purchase software; there-
fore, licensing quickly became the norm. See id. at 100 (discussing reasons why
software licensing is accepted).
205. For a further discussion of the goals of copyright law and the competing
interests of copyright owners and the public, see supra notes 24-60 and accompany-
ing text.
206. For a further discussion of the continued prevalence of copyright in-
fringement in the digital context and the resultant effect on industry, see supra
notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
207. For a discussion of why copyright owners need additional protections in
copyright law in the digital age, see supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
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both contract and copyright remedies.208  Furthermore, although the first
sale doctrine does not apply to licenses, licensing achieves two of the main
benefits of the first sale doctrine: increased affordability and availabil-
ity.209  Therefore, in the digital context, license agreements maintain the
traditional balance of copyright law and copyright owners and the public
can continue the “Same Song and Dance.”210
208. See Calaba, supra note 49, at 10 (explaining how licenses give copyright
owners additional protection against infringement by permitting contract reme-
dies in addition to copyright remedies).
209. For a further discussion of how licenses can increase the affordability
and availability of copyrighted works, see supra notes 190-201 and accompanying
text.
210. EMINEM, supra note 175.  For a discussion of how licenses maintain the
intended balance of copyright law, see supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol57/iss1/6
